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THE BURNING

O

n March 20, 2011, during a mock jury trial in
which the Reverend Terry Jones (Reverend Jones)
presided from the pulpit as judge, the Koran was
found guilty of crimes against humanity.1 Reverend Jones, dressed in a judicial robe, then ordered it torched and
had the burning streamed live to Muslims around the world on
the Internet with Arabic subtitles.2
Afghan President Hamid Karzai condemned this event on
March 31, 2011, and the following day, violent rioting broke out
across the Arab world.3 Before this rioting ended, over ninety
people were injured4 and twenty-three lay dead, including two
American soldiers.5

THE REACTION
Most disagree with the way in which Reverend Jones expressed his dissatisfaction with the Muslim religion;6 yet, most
agree that the First Amendment of the Constitution gave him a right to do so.7 I, on the other
hand, believed prosecution should have been
considered immediately. In so urging I wrote:
[It] is illegal to falsely yell fire in a crowded
theater because doing so presents a clear
and present danger, and it should be illegal
to set fire to the Koran for the same reason.
Authorities should immediately begin considering the prosecution of Mr. Jones for
inciting a riot.8
This prompted several readers to respond online saying:
This has to be the dumbest letters [sic] to the editor that I have ever read. Is there any requirement
for intelligence before the Post publishes a letter?
Perhaps the writer was absent the year that they taught
the Bill of Rights. You also cannot make up laws as
you go along.

So, if someone attacks and kills a flag burner, then all
other flag burners should be prosecuted? Free speech
is protected only if it does not have negative results.
kitchendragon50
I almost agree: Free speech is protected.
AmviennaVA9

THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Free speech is indeed protected. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . .”10 Consequently, the government cannot “[r]
estrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”11 The reason for this protection “[i]s to
allow ‘free trade of ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming
majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.”12
Furthermore, certain actions are treated as protected “symbolic speech” under the First Amendment.13
For example, after the American flag was
burned during a peaceful political protest in
Texas14 the Dallas District Attorney prosecuted and convicted the person responsible
for flag desecration.15 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, reversed and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the burning constituted protected
symbolic speech.16
The majority explained, because breach
of the peace was not likely, “[n]o reasonable
onlooker would have regarded [the defendant’s] generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange
fisticuffs.”17 However, the Court added, “[t]he State need not
worry that our holding will disable it from preserving the peace.
We do not suggest that the First Amendment forbids a State to
prevent ‘imminent lawless action.’”18
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Indeed, there are generally recognized exceptions to freedom of speech protections.19 One such exception is when the
speech “[i]s directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”20 There is
also the “fighting words exception” for words that are “[l]ikely
to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause
a breach of the peace.”21 These principles, together with the instant facts, lead directly to the “The Anti-Riot Act.”22

THE ANTI-RIOT ACT
The government is charged with the duty of carefully determining when an expression is not protected speech.23 It is
maintained here that Reverend Jones’ speech should not be considered protected; to the contrary, his speech should be treated
as an overt act in violation of the Anti-Riot Act codified in 18
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2102. These sections read in pertinent part:
Section 2101
Whoever . . . uses any facility of interstate or foreign
commerce, including, but not limited to, the mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, with intent–(1)
to incite a riot; . . . and who . . . during the course of
any such use . . . performs or attempts to perform any
other overt act for any purpose specified in subparagraph (1) [i.e. to incite a riot] . . . shall be fined under
this title, or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.24
Section 2102
(a) As used in this chapter, the term “riot” means a
public disturbance involving (1) an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an assemblage
of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and present danger of, or shall result in,
damage or injury to the property of any other person or
to the person of any other individual . . .
(b) As used in this chapter, the term “to incite a riot,”
or “to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or
carry on a riot,” includes, but is not limited to, urging or instigating other persons to riot, but shall not be
deemed to mean the mere oral or written (1) advocacy
of ideas or (2) expression of belief, not involving advocacy of any act or acts of violence or assertion of
the rightness of, or the right to commit, any such act
or acts.25
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The statute was enacted in 1968 to address the alleged
violent activities of Vietnam War protestors.26 Armed with
this new tool, the government immediately began a grand jury
investigation of protestors in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic National Convention.27 In response, the protestors filed a
class action lawsuit seeking the appointment of a three-judge
panel to consider the constitutionality of the Anti-Riot Act.28
The district court, however, refused to appoint the requested
panel29 and “granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the
lawsuit holding that the constitutional questions presented were
‘wholly insubstantial.’”30 Affirming the decision, the Seventh
Circuit noted:
The district court held that the First Amendment does
not protect rioting and incitement to riot, observing that
these riot provisions ‘deal only with the abuse of First
Amendment rights.’ The statute expressly excludes
oral or written advocacy of ideas or expressions of
belief not involving violence (18 U.S.C. § 2102(b)).31
Subsequently, in Dellinger, eight targets of the grand jury
were indicted for their part in the riots that took place during
the Chicago Convention.32 Six defendants were charged with
making speeches in order to incite, organize, promote, and encourage riots in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2101.33 Two others
were charged with teaching the use of an incendiary device in
violation of another federal statute and all eight were charged
with conspiring to violate the Anti-Riot Act.34
A month after the government began its case, the court declared a mistrial against Seale;35 it took five months to prosecute
the other defendants.36 The jury acquitted the seven remaining
defendants (the “Chicago Seven”) on the conspiracy charges
and acquitted Froines and Weiner of all charges against them.37
Davis, Hayden, Hoffman, Rubin, and Dellinger were convicted
of committing overt acts intending to incite riots in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2101.38 In addition, the trial judge summarily
convicted all seven defendants, along with two attorneys on
criminal contempt charges.39
On appeal, those convicted of violating § 2101 contended,
among other things, that the Anti-Riot Act was unconstitutional.40 In a two to one decision, the Seventh Circuit, in Dellinger, reaffirmed the constitutionality of the statute.41 Many
more First Amendment issues were raised in Dellinger than
were raised in Foran,42 but the Dellinger majority ended up
reaching the same conclusion.43
Dellinger is particularly instructive because, like the instant
case, the overt acts were based wholly on speech.44 In upholding
the constitutionality of the statute, the Court looked at the dual
requirement test in Brandenburg v. Ohio,45 which holds that
speech is not protected if it is “[d]irected to inciting or produc-
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The question then becomes, does burning the Koran amount to
“symbolic fighting words” that lose First Amendment protection
under the present circumstances?
ing imminent lawless action” and “[l]ikely to incite or produce
such action.”46
The Dellinger court reaffirmed the constitutionality of the
Anti-Riot Act, but reversed the convictions on other grounds
and remanded the case for further action, as the government
deemed appropriate.47 Before remanding, the Court reviewed
the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether any defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal when the case
was returned to the trial court and concluded no such ruling was
mandated.48
In United States v. Markiewicz,49 the Anti-Riot Act was
again tested and its constitutionality was again upheld.50 Markiewicz involved an intra-tribal feud between two factions of
the Oneida Indian Nation.51 During the feud, members of the
aggressive faction damaged and closed a gas station owned by
an Oneida family in the opposing faction.52 In another incident,
members of the aggressive faction broke into “The Nation’s”
bingo hall and assaulted members of the opposing faction and
confronted television reporters.53
As a result of these incidents, five individuals were charged
on several counts, including a conspiracy to violate the AntiRiot Act (Count III) and a substantive violation of the Act
(Count IV).54 All defendants were convicted on the conspiracy
charge and four of the five were convicted of the substantive
charge.55 The statute withstood constitutional attack on appeal.56
The Supreme Court has not examined 18 U.S.C. § 2101,
but its holding in R.A.V. v. St. Paul is informative.57 Here, an individual known as R.A.V. allegedly burned a cross on the lawn
of an African-American family and, as a result, was charged
with violating an ordinance58 that provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti,
including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.59
The trial court dismissed this charge on the ground the ordinance was substantially overbroad and impermissibly contentbased.60
50

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
ordinance was not overly broad because the phrase “arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others” limited its reach to “fighting words” within the meaning of Chaplinsky, a category of
expression unprotected by the First Amendment.61 The court
also held that “the ordinance was not impermissibly contentbased because it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest in protecting the community against biasmotivated threats to public safety and order.”62
The United States Supreme Court reversed.63 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, agreed that the ordinance was limited
to “fighting words” and as such did not “have a claim upon the
First Amendment.”64 However, Justice Scalia stated,
St. Paul has not singled out an especially offensive
mode of expression—it has not, for example, selected
for prohibition only those fighting words that communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely
obnoxious) manner. Rather, it has proscribed fighting
words of whatever manner that communicate messages
of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity
of this sort creates the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas.65
In reversing, the Court held that the ordinance was fatally
flawed because it did not identify the type of fighting words that
were prohibited with sufficient specificity, and because it only
prohibited the use of fighting words that insult, or provoke violence “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”66
The latter was completely unacceptable considering that “[t]
hose who wish to use ‘fighting words’ in connection with other
ideas—to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality—are not
covered.”67 The Court stated, “[t]he First Amendment does not
permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on disfavored subjects.”68
The Anti-Riot Act is distinguishable from the ordinance
in R.A.V., because it only prohibits “those fighting words that
communicate ideas in a threatening (as opposed to a merely
obnoxious) manner”69 and because these fighting words are not
limited to provoking any specified class such as “race, color,
creed, religion or gender.”70 Depending on the circumstances,
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fighting words or words that are “likely to incite a riot” can
lose First Amendment protection.71 The question then becomes, does burning the Koran amount to “symbolic fighting
words” that lose First Amendment protection under the present
circumstances?
The answer is found in Virginia v. Black,72 which addressed several First Amendment issues.73 Relevant here, two
individuals burned a cross on an African-American’s front yard
and were charged with violating a Virginia statute making it a
felony to burn a cross on the property of another with the intent of intimidating any person or group.74 One defendant pled
guilty, “reserving the right to challenge the constitutionality”
of the statute.75 The other went to trial and was convicted.76 In
the contested case the victim testified that, although not hurt, he
was “very nervous” because he “didn’t know what would be the
next phase,” and because “a cross burned in your yard . . . tells
you that it’s just the first round.”77
Each defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that
Virginia’s “burning statute” was “facially unconstitutional.”78 In
upholding the constitutionality of the statute the Court noted its
previous holding that “[a] State may punish those words ‘which
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’”79 Justice O’Connor, writing for the
Court, more specifically found,
The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw
cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form
of intimidation . . . . Virginia may choose to regulate
this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross
burning’s long and pernicious history as a signal of
impending violence.80
That is, Virginia’s “burning statute” passes constitutional
muster because in order to make the burning illegal it requires
that the act take place with an intent to do something more than
convey a message or idea. Like the Virginia statute, 18 U.S.C. §
2101 requires something more than burning the Koran to make
the act illegal.81 The Koran must have been burned with the
intent to incite a riot.82
Some may argue that foreign extremists should not be allowed to limit our First Amendment rights.83 Such an argument
will not prevail, however, because the statute specifically prohibits the use of both domestic and “foreign commerce” to incite riots, and a riot is a riot regardless of where it occurs. The
question remains, did Reverend Jones intend to incite foreign
extremists?
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THE INTENT
Recent history has demonstrated that radical Muslims (who
make up approximately .001 percent of the two billion Muslims)84 react violently to particularly virulent attacks on their
religion.85 In 1989, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini condemned
The Satanic Verses, by Salman Rushdie, because of its heretical depiction of the Muslim religion.86 Consequently, Khomeini
declared a “fatwa” and ordered that Rushdie be put to death.87
As a result of this “fatwa,” Japanese and Italian translators of
the book were killed and a Norwegian publisher was attacked
and almost killed.88 Rushdie, a British citizen, went into hiding
for almost ten years, and was given twenty-four/seven police
protection.89
The violent reaction of radical Muslims to cartoons insulting the prophet Muhammad is also common knowledge. It is
only necessary to click on Wikipedia to see that:
s In 2005, a Danish newspaper published twelve editorial cartoons of the prophet Muhammad that incited
rioting and worse.
s When the cartoons were reprinted in newspapers
around the world, Islamic protests escalated.
s Approximately 139 people, were killed protesting
these cartoons; most due to police firing on the crowds,
mainly in Nigeria, Libya, and Afghanistan.
s Reaction to these cartoons caused Danish embassies in
Syria, Lebanon, and Iran to be set on fire and European
buildings stormed.
s Danish troops stationed in Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan, became the “primary target” of the Taliban.90
In September 2010, Reverend Jones said, “[o]ur message
is a message of warning to the radical element of Islam.”91
When the word of his planned “burning” got out, an angry mob
chanting “[d]eath to America” formed in Afghanistan while
thousands gathered in protest outside the embassy in Jakarta,
Indonesia.92
General David H. Petraeus, commander of United States
Forces in Afghanistan, warned that if “the burning” actually
took place “the safety of our soldiers and civilians would be
put in jeopardy . . . .”93 President Obama addressed the consequences over the airwaves to ensure that Reverend Jones was
aware of what could happen ,94 and Defense Secretary Robert M.
Gates even called Reverend Jones directly.95
In spite of the reactions in Afghanistan and Indonesia and
warnings from General Petraeus, Secretary Gates, and the President, Reverend Jones put the Koran on trial and, after the guilty
verdict was in, ordered it burned.96 In so doing, Reverend Jones
said he understood this might elicit a violent response 97 and it
worried him. 98
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However, after thinking twice about it, 99 he decided to proceed because “[i]n the end, his desire to shed light on what he
calls a ‘dangerous book’ won out.”100 “‘Did our action provoke
them?’ the pastor asked. ‘Of course,’” he answered.101
Reverend Jones emphasized, “[i]t [i.e. the burning] was
intended to stir the pot: if you don’t shake the boat everyone
will stay in their complacency,”102 and added, this “shows the
radical element of Islam.”103 These statements make it clear that
Reverend Jones intended to tease radical Muslims and, tellingly,
he indicated that “[g]iven the chance he would do it all over
again.”104
After the burning and in the midst of the ensuing violence,
General Petreaus took things out of academia and put them in
the real world when he said:
Every security force leader’s worst nightmare is being
confronted by essentially a mob, if you will, especially
one that can be influenced by individuals that want to
incite violence, who want to try to hijack passions, in
this case, perhaps understandable passions.105

THE CRIME

is not that their content communicates any particular
idea, but that their content embodies a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.108
Congress enacted the Anti-Riot Act to deal with Vietnam
radicals back in the 1960s and, indeed, when the speech of some
“radicals” incited other “radicals” to riot, the speechmakers
were indicted, prosecuted, and convicted under this statute.109
When the statute was attacked on First Amendment grounds on
appeal, the Seventh Circuit held it to be constitutional.110
Furthermore, under this statute, the crime is complete when
an individual uses any facility of interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to incite a riot and commits an overt act to
achieve this purpose, whether a riot occurs or not.111 The Koran
burning, of course, did result in riots.112

THE FUTURE
Reverend Jones has taken his show on the road.113 On April
30, 2011, he spoke in Dearborn, Michigan, where it was reported that:

Reverend Jones is guilty of violating this statute. He burned
the Koran intending to incite a riot and hijack passions. He
knew the burning would enrage Muslims and he made sure the
event reached those who historically reacted violently to attacks
on their religion to increase the likelihood of riots. He did this
by streaming the event worldwide over the Internet with Arabic
subtitles.107
The Anti-Riot Act does not prohibit speech; it protects
the peace. Reverend Jones is free to convey his thoughts about
the Koran and his speech will be, and has been, protected, but
“fighting words” and words “directed to inciting and likely to
incite imminent lawless action” do not constitute protected
speech. As Justice Scalia said in R.A.V.:

Repeatedly [Reverened Jones] provoked the crowd
and insulted them. At one point, he ignored police
requests by ambling down to the front of police barricades while taunting his opponents.
Angered, some of those protesters stormed past
their police barricades and marched across Michigan
Avenue as they hurled bottles and shoes at Jones’ supporters across from them. One woman spit in Jones’
direction.
The young crowd then pushed down a security
fence that separated them from Jones’ supporters and
surged forward, their faces tight with anger. For a moment, it appeared a major clash was about to break out.
But Arab-American leaders and police pushed
back the angry group as dozens of police officers in
full riot gear marched out in single file to separate the
two sides. At least two were arrested. Dearborn Mayor
John O’Reilly Jr. said afterward that Jones was responsible for creating the disturbance by ignoring city requests not to approach the barricade.
“He refused to comply,” O’Reilly said. “He was
asked, ‘Please don’t come to the barricade.’ He just
ignored us. . . . His goal was to start trouble. . . . That
shows his character.”114

The reason why fighting words are categorically excluded from the protection of the First Amendment

Reverend Jones now says he is considering a mock trial for the
Islamic prophet Muhammad.115

18 U.S.C. § 2101
Whoever . . . uses any facility of interstate or foreign
commerce, including, but not limited to, the mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, or television, with intent (1)
to incite a riot; . . . and who . . . during the course of
any such use . . . performs or attempts to perform any
other overt act for any purpose specified in subparagraph (1) [i.e. to incite a riot] . . . is subject to fine and
imprisonment.106
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Should Reverend Jones “strike” again with the same intent and
with the same results, both the rioters and the inciters should be
prosecuted. No one should be able to escape prosecution because
foreign, instead of domestic, extremists are incited or because
innocent people lay dead in Afghanistan instead of New York.
THE END
Burning the Koran in the United States to express disagreement with Islam is not a crime. The response is different in other
parts of the world.116 Most Western European countries have
made hate speech, which includes burning the Koran, a criminal offense.117 For example, in Great Britain, an individual who
burned the Koran in January 2011, has been convicted of a hate
speech crime and sentenced to seventy days in jail.118
In the Netherlands, a man was prosecuted for making a
film in which he sharply criticized the Koran and called upon
Muslims to destroy it; and publishers, editors, and authors in
France, Canada, Norway, and Italy, were prosecuted for their
sharp critiques of Islam and Muslim immigration.119 Film star,
Brigitte Bardot was convicted five times for her derogatory remarks about Islamic practices.120
In Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan,
and many other countries in the Organization of Islamic States,
burning the Koran is blasphemy and punished by imprisonment
or execution.121 In short, burning the Koran is recognized as
symbolic “fighting words” in many countries around the world.
While burning the Koran in order to express an opinion
about the Muslim religion is not a crime in the United States, it
is a crime to burn it with the intention of inciting a riot.122 The
distinction is subtle, but it is a distinction with a difference, and
one that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Who is the bad guy here: “The beast or the person who
teased the beast so much so that it killed innocent people?”123
The answer is, both. Riots and murder in response to symbolic
attacks on religion, no matter how offensive, cannot be condoned. Those involved in the riots were immediately arrested
in Afghanistan,124 and, here, the person who teased the beast
should have been under investigation.
To appeal to a jury, the time for putting Reverend Jones
on trial for this burning may have passed. However, he is now
threatening to place the prophet Muhammad on trial.125 Should
this happen, and should the evidence so warrant, prosecution of
both incidents would be justified. If timely brought, there would
Criminal Law Brief

be a reasonable probability of conviction and a reasonable probability the conviction would be sustained on appeal.
Congress enacted the Anti-Riot Act to prevent rioting and
the potential killing of innocent people.126 If twenty-three people
lay dead in New York because someone admittedly incited domestic extremists with “fighting words,” the inciter, along with
those responsible for the killing would likely have been indicted
by now.
Should Reverend Jones “strike” again with the same intent and with the same results, both the rioters and the inciters
should be prosecuted. No one should be able to escape prosecution because foreign, instead of domestic, extremists are incited
or because innocent people lay dead in Afghanistan instead of
New York.
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